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hThe Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000 study,
supported by the Kauffman Foundation, correlates
about one-half of a country’s rate of economic
growth to its level of entrepreneurial activity.1 Small
businesses are dynamic players in the U.S. economy,
using innovative approaches to explore markets and
test new ideas. Microenterprises, extremely small
community-based businesses often run by low- to
moderate-income people, have been supported as a
means of poverty alleviation. From the global com-
munity to the local community, microenterprises play
a critical role in America. Their ability to foster a live-
ly business environment is not up for debate. What is
up for debate is how best to support them. 
The following articles explore issues related to
microenterprise activity. In the first article, Kristin
Kanders focuses on a study titled “Giving a Leg Up to
Bootstrap Entrepreneurship” and asks how regula-
tions influence the level of entrepreneurship and how
we can improve the situation. A second article, writ-
ten by James Carras of Carras Community
Investment, Inc. discusses a new federal program, the
New Markets Tax Credit, and its prospects for sup-
porting community development. Timothy Bates of
Wayne State University then lends a historical per-
spective to the discussion of financing small busi-
nesses, as he compares Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to the Minority
Enterprise Small Business Corporations of the 1960s.
Finally, Mark Pinsky and Laura Schwingel of the
National Community Capital Association and the
CDFI Coalition explain why they believe their indus-
try is different from the MESBICs that began in the
1960s. They present themselves as a new breed of
economic developers, ready to take on the challenges
of today’s marketplace.
1. The study notes that “despite the high degree of associa-
tion between entrepreneurship and economic growth,
exceptions suggest there is no one catalyst to economic
growth. Ireland, for example, has enjoyed rapid economic
growth with relatively low levels of entrepreneurial activi-
ty. For many countries entrepreneurship may be a key to
economic prosperity but it is not always the only key.”
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Why Microenterprise?
Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich
on the impact of microenterprises:
It is at the community and neighborhood
level that the process of family and com-
munity asset-building takes shape and
where entrepreneurship leads some, literal-
ly, out of poverty. In poorer neighborhoods
and communities, small business develop-
ment provides everyday retail and commer-
cial services and employment opportunities. 
The development and growth of small firms
at the neighborhood level often contribute
to community revitalization, help stabilize
real estate values, and provide impetus for
additional investments by business, govern-
ment, homeowners, and homebuyers. Local
entrepreneurs often become valued infor-
mal community resources or leaders in
more formal civic and political organiza-
tions. In many communities, they represent
the heart of the way that local economic
vitality is created and maintained.
N
o less than the American ethos is based on the idea that
microenterprise activity (starting small but with large
reserves of hard work and ingenuity) can lead to improved
economic prospects. In addition to the personal rewards that stem
from pride of accomplishment and ownership, our capitalistic sys-
tem relies on entrepreneurship to keep itself thriving. Making
Microenterprise
For entrepreneurs without much capital,
stumbling blocks can mean the difference
between starting a business and not trying.
Regulations can be one stumbling block to
entrepreneurship, but balance, argue advo-
cates for both sides, is what’s needed. 
       Quality 
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E
ver had the experience of standing in a
long line, only to be sent to another long
line, only to find out you needed to get
an application from somewhere else first? It’s
enough to frustrate even the most tranquil of
us, and when you add in some arcane require-
ments, can deter would-be entrepreneurs. 
To assess whether obstacles inhibit the growth
of would-be entrepreneurs, Boston’s Pioneer
Institute for Public Policy Research conducted a
study of the regulatory climate for microenter-
prises — businesses that employ fewer than five
people, require less than $25,000 in start-up
capital, and are typically run by low- to moder-
ate-income individuals. Collaborating with
other think tanks in Atlanta, Dallas, and Los
Angeles, the group compared regulatory burden
among cities. The study they produced, “Giving
a Leg Up to Bootstrap Entrepreneurship:
Expanding Economic Opportunity in America’s
Urban Centers,” highlights cases where the
business atmosphere helps and hinders entre-
preneurs; it also makes suggestions for regula-
tory reform.1
Burden or Quality Control?
Reducing the number of hoops an entrepreneur
must jump through to become legitimate does
more than diminish the sweat involved in run-
ning a business. Making it easier for entrepre-
neurs can mean that consumers have more var-
ied and less expensive goods and services.
Licensing and other regulations cost the entre-
preneur money, directly when he buys a permit
or indirectly when he pays for schooling or spe-
cial equipment to gain accreditation. That cost   
is transferred to the consumer. While schooling require-
ments are logical licensing prerequisites for professions
such as medicine, is it necessary to go to cosmetology
school to open a hair-braiding shop (especially when the
skill isn’t part of the curriculum)? These are the kinds of
questions the report raises. 
Onerous regulations encourage microenterprises to
maintain an illegal status. And being underground hin-
ders microenterprises from growing into bigger busi-
nesses because they cannot obtain bank financing, nor
can they fully market themselves for fear of attracting
inspection service scrutiny. The bigger cost, however,
may be that stringent licensing and permitting require-
ments limit the market and restrict choices. Rigorous
requirements dissuade start-ups from entering business
and can slow an economy.
The main reason for regulation of entry-level business-
es is to guard quality. However, as the report reveals,
regulations “rarely address performance and quality
issues” and they tend to “focus on compliance with rules
rather than performance.” As George Mason University
economics professor Walter Williams has argued, high
barriers to entry lower the number of practitioners in a
field and can result in consumers choosing “do-it-your-
self” methods. He has noted that “in jurisdictions where
there is a strict licensing of electricians, there is a high-
er incidence of fires of an electrical origin. Many people
can’t afford the high-cost services of electricians, so
they jury-rig wiring themselves and use extension cords,
thereby increasing the risk of fire.” Williams believes
that a range of quality services, from Tiffany’s to Target,
is optimal. 
Certification is one way to obtain information about
quality. If entrepreneurs of the same field were to take a
test, the highest-scoring ones could call themselves
“Class A” practitioners and the middle-scoring ones
could be “Class C” practitioners. This, argues Williams, is
more cost-effective and accurate than licensing the pro-
fession. Microenterprises, free-market lovers, and eco-
nomic developers would propose easing regulations.
Considering how important small businesses are to the
Easier by Kristin Kandershis case in small-claims court — “the
libertarian way to solve dispute.” He
adds, “My attorney advised me,
however, that the court system is not
well-equipped to deal with small
consumer complaints because it
doesn’t have the expertise to deter-
mine fault and because it is over-
whelmed. As a solution, the courts
often decide disputes by ordering
each side to pay half the amount in
question.” If there were a board of
regulation for mechanics, Wood
could have filed a complaint without
wasting his own time or money. His
own organization receives about
2,400 complaints per year and takes
about 230 actions per year, resulting
in between $100,000 to $200,000
being refunded to consumers.
Evaluating the Home
Market
In comparison to the other cities,
Boston fared better than micro-
managing Atlanta but worse than
entrepreneurial-friendly Dallas. The
“Bootstrap” report analyzed taxicab
economy, who wouldn’t? The answer:
current practitioners. Historically,
reducing restrictions has been
opposed overwhelmingly by those
already in the field who fear that
losing entitlement will mean losing
profits. When former Massachusetts
Governor Weld attempted to dissolve
11 boards of registration, the oppo-
nents were not concerned citizens
but licensed practitioners.
Bill Wood, Director of the
Commonwealth’s Division of
Professional Licensure, is a cautious
regulator. His organization oversees
licensing and regulation for 36
occupational boards ranging from
cosmetologists to nurses, and while
he is “not in the business of seeking
out more work,” he does recognize
the value of regulation for con-
sumers. Relating how a car mechan-
ic (an unlicensed professional) per-
formed faulty work on his car, Wood
says that he was left with inadequate
recourse. His option to solve the dis-
pute was to hire a lawyer to argue
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regulation among the four cities and
highlights Boston as a positive
example of keeping licensing
requirements in check. It suggests
the growth of Boston’s livery service
(limousines and shuttles) can be
attributed to its freedom from a
medallion system of regulation.
While the industry is licensed — the
cost of the special license plate is
$40 per year — the start-up capital
is minimal compared to what is
required to purchase a medallion,
about $180,000. This analogy is
used to defend one of the Pioneer
Institute’s main recommendations,
“Cities should avoid extending reg-
ulatory rules to new occupations
and businesses.”
The report also analyzes the regula-
tions governing Boston’s home-
based businesses, such as daycare
and catering, street-vending busi-
nesses, and cosmetology. Home-
based businesses are an inexpensive
way to start a microenterprise, yet
zoning restrictions are designed to
keep residential areas free from vis-
ible signs of commercial activity.
While many people would prefer
that residential and commercial dis-
tricts be separated, some of the zon-
ing restrictions are not intuitive.
For example, a home-based busi-
ness cannot employ anyone living
outside the home, maintain inven-
tory, or use more than 25 percent of
the floor area for business purposes.
Would allowing these activities
necessarily harm the neighbor-
hood’s character?
Peg Ryan, Entrepreneurial Training
Services Director for the Common-
wealth Corporation, a quasi-public
nonprofit agency involved in work-
force development and economic
development initiatives throughout
Massachusetts, believes, “One of the
biggest hurdles for microenterprises
is towns that don’t allow home-
based businesses. For example, in
Quincy, you’re not allowed to run a
business from your home, and office
space is very expensive.” Ryan notes
that for many microenterprises,
starting from home is the most
effective way to begin. In the mean-
One of the biggest hurdles for microenterprises is towns 
that don’t allow home-based businesses.
shoe repair                
small appliance repair
sewing/alterations        
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The figure below, based on surveying of small business fields,  com-
pares regulatory burden among occupations. time, her organization has devel-
oped a small business incubator and




in-home food preparation. Pioneer
reports that health code policies pro-
hibit using residential kitchens to
prepare food for sale. A separate
commercial-grade kitchen must be
used but, says Pioneer, these can be
as unsanitary as residential kitchens.
And those preparing food illegally
are never inspected. The law fails to
protect consumers, asserts the report,
because “in-home catering is a thriv-
ing, if illegal, sector in Boston, serv-
ing as an important point of entry
for entrepreneurs.” A solution to the
in-home food preparation situation
promoted by the Institute would
determine a kitchen’s adequacy and
cleanliness based on inspection, not
an arbitrary rule. A less pervasive
change would allow those selling
homemade goods to inform cus-
tomers that their goods were pre-
pared in a noncommercial kitchen.
Pioneer also claims that inner-city
entrepreneurs who want to sell
homemade goods are not allowed to,
although farm families often sell
homemade items such as jams, cakes,
and cookies at farmers’ markets. 
Beth Altman of the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health,
Division of Food and Drugs, says
“the state is not opposed to in-home
businesses, but is opposed to high-
risk foods being prepared in non-
commercial settings.” She disagrees
with Pioneer’s assertion that a dis-
crepancy exists between what inner-
city and farm residents can sell to
the public. Massachusetts, which
adopted the Federal Food Code in
October, has included its own regu-
lation that allows food with low risk
of causing illness to be prepared in
any residential kitchen — city or
country — with a residential kitchen
license. This includes baked items
and jams and jellies — the foods
often seen at farmers’ markets —
because her organization believes
“there are certain things that can
Massachusetts Cosmetology Board,
says her organization did a lot of
research to determine if hair braiders
fell under the statutory guidelines
for hairdressers. The board’s affir-
mative decision was based on
research showing that braiders often
end up trimming, straightening
(with commercial chemicals), and
dying hair. Says Peveri, “The most
compelling reason for requiring
licensure is that the sanitation issues
are no different than those raised for
any hairdressing procedure.”
It’s jarring to realize that an aspiring
cosmetologist must complete 1,000
hours of training to obtain a license,
while the training requirement for
family (in-home) daycare providers
is a three-hour orientation.2
Promoted by Pioneer Institute and
welfare-to-work advocates as a
viable business opportunity for
entry-level workers with little edu-
cation and few special skills, the
Institute would like to make the
licensing process even less cumber-
some. Although daycare licensure in
safely be made in the home and
marketed to the public.” Altman
adds that although the residential
kitchen license can be granted
statewide, cities and towns can deny
granting the licenses for zoning or
other reasons. 
Licensing requirements were also
shown to be incompatible with the
service rendered. For example,
Boston’s African-hair braiders must
complete 1,000 hours of training
costing between $5,000 and $8,000
to obtain a cosmetology license.
Pioneer contends the training teach-
es skills unrelated to the braiding
technique. In California, a lawsuit
resulted in hair braiders’ exemption
from the license requirement. But
Bill Wood of the Division of
Professional Licensure believes more
care should be taken to develop leg-
islation that is less encompassing.
He notes the cosmetology board
enforces a statute requiring that
anyone “arranging hair for hire”
hold a cosmetology license. Helen
Peveri, Executive Director of the
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The paradox of family child care is that although its
connection to protecting the public’s health and welfare
is palpable, regulation and enforcement are not.lation and enforcement of standards?
According to Roberta Malavenda of
Quality Care for Children, the reason
is that “taking care of children is seen
as community work” rather than as a
profession. But, says Malavenda,
“when you start charging — then you
are a business” and “when public dol-
lars go for child-care subsidies — then
you’re required to be accountable.”
Malavenda points to a recent trend of
family child care professionals wel-
coming inspection checks and
accreditation programs as marketing
tools for safe programs.  Referring to
her state of Georgia, Malavenda says
that in order to not push providers
underground, regulatory enhance-
ment needs to happen slowly, with
buy-in from providers and with tech-
nical assistance.
What’s striking about regulations
affecting microenterprises is the
incongruity. In-home child care is
lightly regulated but in-home cater-
ing is totally prohibited. What’s also
interesting is that regulatory
enforcement is scarce, so even
though there may be tough regula-
tions, are they tough if conse-
quences are rarely felt? Also notable
is the importance of public percep-
tion in regulating microenterprises.
Are hair braiders just styling hair, or
are they just another type of cosme-
tologist and, therefore, not suitable
for special treatment? Is taking care
of children community work or is it
Massachusetts is not costly, Pioneer
alleges the paperwork-intensive
process encourages providers to
operate without certification. To
remedy the paperwork problem,
Massachusetts’ Office of Child Care
Services Communications Director
Kate Arsenault says her organiza-
tion created a Paperwork Committee
to look at paperwork issues and it
initiated a system allowing potential
licensees to submit documents elec-
tronically. But Arsenault also
believes Massachusetts’ licensing
requirements “are not minimum
standards, but quality standards.”
Even in a “strict” state such as
Massachusetts, family child care
providers operating without a
license are not dealt with harshly —
so as not to disrupt working fami-
lies. Arsenault says that those oper-
ating without licenses are often
unaware of the requirement. Most
of these providers are allowed to
continue operating while they get
licensing assistance from the Office.
Ignorance of the law, in this case,
seems to keep things running,
whereas in the restaurant business,
it will result in closed doors.
The paradox of family child care is
that although its connection to pro-
tecting the public’s health and wel-
fare is palpable, regulation and
enforcement are not. Why are par-
ents not clamoring for stricter regu-
a business? The irony is that
improved public perception (from
community work to business) is
what microenterprises want, yet it
puts them in a position of increased
regulation. The goal, of course, is to
not make regulation debilitating.
Implementing Change
City Council President Charles
Yancey supports working with the
Pioneer Institute to enhance
Boston’s entrepreneurial environ-
ment and acknowledges the City has
some arcane regulations that deserve
evaluation. For example, Yancey
thinks it is “unreasonable that in
order to operate a radio in a fast-
food restaurant you have to come to
City Hall to get a specific ‘entertain-
ment’ license.” Noting there may be
similar regulations, Yancey believes
it would be advantageous to do a
study of all existing regulations to
determine which ones need to be
changed. In general, he believes it is
“essential to take a close look at
steps the City can take to facilitate
the growth of businesses within
Boston, particularly small businesses
because they are so vital for job cre-
ation.” Yancey adds that the City is
making a “determined effort to put
permitting and licensing services
online.” Moving processes online is
expected to help microenterprise
owners, 84 percent of whom have
access to the web either in their
home or place of business.3




Year in 1998, recently
added another pushcart
to his Black Library oper-
ation. He and his co-
worker now sell books in
Dudley Station and
Downtown Crossing. 9c  &  b
While the City of Boston works to
simplify the regulatory process for
microenterprises, Nuestra Commun-
idad Development Corporation (CDC)
is implementing its own program to
help entrepreneurs get in business.
The Village Pushcarts Program
began in 1998 with workforce devel-
opment in mind. Project manager
Mike Kerlin says that many of the
people in the Roxbury and
Dorchester communities that his
CDC serves “wanted to start a busi-
ness, but they didn’t have the finan-
cial resources, credit history, or busi-
ness skills to run it successfully.” 
The Pushcarts Program allows bud-
ding entrepreneurs to rent a pushcart
from Nuestra for $200 a month with
the hassles of securing a permit and
a pushcart location taken care of by
the CDC. Says Kerlin, “A lot of peo-
ple will have a business idea and so
one of the first things they’ll do is go
out and buy a pushcart. Then they
realize that the most difficult thing
by far is getting a pushcart loca-
tion!” To get a location, Kerlin adds,
you must first get a permit from the
Department of Public Works (which
costs about $270) and then seek per-
mission from the abutting store
owner.4 “If I were to start a busi-
ness,” says Kerlin, “the Pushcart
Program is the way I’d go; it’s the
perfect low-cost, low-risk way to try
it out.” Currently Nuestra can rent
out 15 pushcarts, but using a grant
from the Federal Office of
Community Services, it plans to
increase the number to 40 by 2006.
Apart from giving entrepreneurs an
inexpensive, cautious way to start a
business or supplement their income,
the pushcart program has also been
lauded for its neighborhood revital-
ization. The pushcarts in Dudley
Station have been credited with
making the station lively, safe, and
clean. The program has also created
“neighborhood linkages,” says
Kerlin. He notes that Roxbury resi-
dents’ selling of Caribbean flags and
African-American literature in
Boston Common and Downtown
Crossing is a positive way to accent
the city’s diversity.
The next step for Nuestra is to enable
its community to sell food from a
pushcart. “There’s a lot of communi-
ty demand, and selling food is both
more lucrative and recession-resist-
ant than merchandise,” notes Kerlin.
It’s tougher, though, because regula-
tions in Boston prohibit operating a
food pushcart unless it has a certi-
fied commercial kitchen to rest in
each evening. In addition, if a per-
son wants to sell his or her own
food, it must be prepared in a com-
mercial-grade kitchen, not one’s
home kitchen. Says Kerlin, “You
may want to sell food, but who has
a certified commercial kitchen?” To
solve the problem, Nuestra plans to
open a commercial-grade kitchen
later this summer where the food
pushcarts can be stored. Later in the
year they plan to expand the kitchen
to allow caterers, bakers, and others




Considering the hurdles entrepre-
neurs face, especially when looking
for financing, Nuestra’s approach to
helping microenterprises get started
is vital. In the Opinion Dynamics
survey of microenterprise owners in
the Greater Boston area, over one-
third of 300 respondents either
“strongly” or “somewhat” agreed
with the statements “I’ve had real
trouble getting the credit I need to
make my business a success” and “I
underestimated how much it would
cost to get me into this business and
have been struggling with that since
the first day.” 
Also instructive is the breakdown of
how people finance their businesses.
When asked to select financing
methods used (respondents were
instructed to select all that apply),
76 percent said that they used their
own savings. The percentage of peo-
ple who relied on credit from a bank
or commercial lending source (20
percent) was less than the percent-
age of people who either borrowed
from friends and relatives (24 per-
cent) or borrowed from credit cards
(25 percent). 
Borrowing from special small-busi-
ness or start-up funds was limited;
only 5 percent said it applied to their
situation. These funds, however, are
generating renewed interest since
passage of legislation during the
Clinton Administration creating the
New Markets Tax Credit Program
and the Community Development
Financial Institution Fund. These
financing sources, their role in eco-
nomic development, and the possi-
ble pitfalls they may be able to
avoid, are the subject of the follow-
ing three articles.
Bolstering economic development is
the goal of these financing initia-
tives, just as easing regulatory bur-
den is a Pioneer Institute mission.
Obtaining these objectives would
allow microenterprises to focus on
what matters: the business. After all,
standing in line gets tiring, but mak-
ing products and profits is part of
the American Dream.
Endnotes
1. The study was published by
Reason Public Policy Institute in Los
Angeles, in conjunction with Pioneer
Institute, Georgia Public Policy
Foundation, and the National Center
for Policy Analysis in Dallas. “Giving
a Leg Up to Bootstrap Entrepreneur-
ship: Expanding Economic Oppor-
tunity in America’s Urban Centers”
can be found at www.pioneerinsti-
tute.org/entre/legup.cfm.
2. Daycare providers in Massachusetts
must also have criminal background
checks for themselves and others liv-
ing in the facility, CPR and First Aid
certification, references, and an
approved facility.
3. A study of microenterprise owners
in the Greater Boston area was con-
ducted by Opinion Dynamics, as
commissioned by the Pioneer
Institute. All the businesses surveyed
employed fewer than four full-time
staff, had been in business for a
maximum of three years, and were
engaged in a nonprofessional trade.
4. Boston areas that accept pushcarts
are Faneuil Hall, Downtown
Crossing, Boston Common, MBTA
stations, Haymarket, the area sur-
rounding Fenway Park, and a few
other smaller venues. Nuestra CDC is
trying to expand the venues that
allow pushcarts.10 c & b
One reason the program is
likely to leverage private
investment is because the
Community Reinvestment
Act’s investment test
prompts banks to be proac-
tive in making debt and
investment capital available
to low- and moderate-
income communities. Often, private
investors make investments in com-
munity development projects
through intermediaries, such as
community development financial
institutions. In the future, these
intermediaries will include a new
category of institutions called “com-
munity development entities.” 
NMTCs are available only to private
investors in eligible community
development entities. Private
investors include corporations,
banks, insurance companies, and
individuals. Banks are the most like-
ly users of these tax credits because
they are the predominant investors
in community development finan-
cial institutions. They provide these
institutions with capital and in turn
they receive a return on their invest-
ment, Community Reinvestment Act
investment test “credit,” and poten-
tially a Bank Enterprise Act award
from the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Community Development Financial
Institution Fund.  
A community development entity
must have as its primary mission
serving or providing investment
capital for low- and moderate-
income communities. These entities
must be certified by the Treasury
and must maintain accountability to
the community, with either commu-
nity representatives serving on the
entities’ board of directors or in an
advisory capacity (the regulations
are still under construction). 
Community Development Financial
Institutions (CDFIs) certified by the
Treasury’s CDFI Fund, or by the
Small Business Administration as
Specialized Small Business
Investment Companies, are automat-
ically community development enti-
ties. Community development cor-
porations that establish for-profit
subsidiaries or limited-liability com-
panies or partnerships may also
qualify. New corporations or part-
nerships that meet the community
development mission and communi-
ty-accountability requirement may
also be eligible. 
H
ow does the New Markets Tax
Credit Program work? Tax
credits will be allocated to
community development entities
through the Treasury’s community
development program — the
Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund). The
allocation process will be competi-






roviding capital to low-
income urban and rural
communities is a key issue
for America in the twenty-
first century. Problems holding back
investment in urban communities
include prejudice, crime, and poor
public education. Rural areas suffer
from additional problems including
obsolete industries, population loss,
and low educational achievement.
Coupled with these social obstacles,
vast changes in the financial servic-
es industry have resulted in the
closing of inner-city and rural
branch facilities. Despite these
obstacles, successful investment
approaches have been identified. In
addition, a substantial federal com-
mitment to leverage private capital,
known as the New Markets Tax
Credit Program, is working its way
through the governmental imple-
mentation process.
The legislation, signed by President
Clinton as part of the Community
Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000,
authorizes $15 billion in tax credits
for private investments over the
next seven years. New Markets Tax
Credits (NMTCs) will have the
potential to enhance capital flow for
economic development in “new
market” low- and moderate-income
communities — both urban and
rural. The credits are valid only for
investment in commercial enterpris-
es and businesses such as office
buildings or grocery stores; they
may not be used for housing, for
which the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit is available. 
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tive and community development
entities with successful track
records, either directly or through
affiliate organizations, will receive
priority. Coastal Enterprises, Inc., a
nonprofit community development
corporation and certified CFDI with
over twenty years of experience
serving Maine, was designated a
community development entity in
early July.
After a community development
entity has received its allocation, it
may distribute the tax credits to its
investors. Investors will receive tax
credits based on the amount of their
equity investment. Equity invest-
ments (either stock or capital inter-
est) must be paid in cash and made
within five years of the Treasury’s
tax-credit allocation to the entity. 
Tax credits are claimed by investors
during seven years, starting on the
date of the investment and on each
anniversary; 5 percent is claimed for
each of the first three years and 6
percent for each of the next four
years. This stream of credits totals 39
percent, with a present value of
approximately 30 percent. (Investors
may carry back unused credits to
years ending after January 1, 2001.)
Funding of the program starts at $1
billion in 2001 and rises in incre-
ments to an authorized $15 billion
in 2006 and 2007. 
Community development entities
(CDEs) can use tax credit investment
proceeds to fund loans or make
equity investments in for-profit and
nonprofit businesses or other CDEs.
For example, a CDE could invest in a
community development corpora-
tion’s project to build a daycare cen-
ter in a low-income area. The equity
provided by the CDE may then
enable the community development
corporation to persuade other
investors to support its project. CDEs
may also purchase loans from other
CDEs, provide financial counseling
and other services, or finance their
own eligible activities. For example,
an entity could develop and manage
commercial real estate, such as an
office building or shopping center.  
A community development entity
must use “substantially all” of the
tax credit investment proceeds for
the above purposes. When final
guidelines are published, the Treasury
Department will define the term
“substantially all,” which will
include at a minimum any allowances
What Is the CDFI Fund?
The CDFI Fund provides capital
and technical assistance to com-
munity development venture capi-
tal and loan funds. Through its
Core Program, the CDFI Fund pro-
vides grants and loans to bolster
investment and loan capital. The
Fund’s technical assistance com-
ponent (known as the Small and
Emerging Community Develop-
ment Financial Institutions
Assistance Program) enables CDFIs
to build capacity through training,
enhancing technology, and con-
sulting services. The CDFI Fund
also provides grants to banks for
community development invest-
ments through the Bank Enterprise
Act Program. Organizations are
limited to $5 million in assistance
during any three-year period.
What Is the New
Markets Venture
Capital Program?
The Small Business Administration
offers further support to commu-
nity development through the
New Markets Venture Capital
Program. Passed in December
2000, the program is providing up
to $50 million this year in direct
support of community develop-
ment venture capital companies.
Community development entities
can apply for both the New
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for administrative expenses, loss
reserves, and expenses related to
both a start-up period for placing
investments and a wind-down peri-
od for recovering investments. In
addition, a CDE must track how tax
credit investments are used if less
than 85 percent of its gross assets
are so invested.
Two Treasury divisions will adminis-
ter the New Markets Tax Credit pro-
gram: the CDFI Fund will certify
community development entities and
make tax credit allocations and the
Internal Revenue Service will devel-
op regulations. Both the Fund and
the IRS will monitor program com-
pliance. Applications for community
development entity certification and
allocations of NMTCs are not expect-
ed to take place until late fall 2001;
allocations should occur in 2002.  
Businesses eligible for investment by
community development entities
must meet the following four tests:
1. Fifty percent of the business must
be derived from conduct within the
low-income community;
2. A substantial portion of the serv-
ices performed by the business’
employees must occur within the
low-income community; 
3. The majority of the facilities must
be located within the low-income
community; and
4. Less than 5 percent of the busi-
ness’ assets can be held in unrelat-
ed investments.
A community is determined to be an
eligible low-income community if
its census tract has a poverty rate of
at least 20 percent or if the median
family income does not exceed 80
percent of the statewide median; or,
in metropolitan areas, if the median
family income does not exceed 80
percent of the greater of the
statewide median or the metropoli-
tan area’s median. The Treasury
Department may also approve a par-
ticular area within a census tract as
a low-income community.
Community development programs
such as the New Markets Tax Credit
and the CDFI Fund reflect the cur-
rent mind-set of utilizing market-
driven approaches to revitalize eco-
nomically distressed communities.
Coupled with economic forces turn-
ing to low-income urban communi-
ties for retail opportunities, these
capital resources will enhance the
ability of community developers to
meet their mission and goals.Financing the Development of Urban Minority Communities
Lessons from
H istory by Timothy Bates
G
overnment policies and
programs that address eco-
nomic problems facing
inner-city minority communities are
often conceived and marketed as
vehicles for achieving goals that are
difficult to meet. One such program
is President Clinton’s Community
Development Financial Institution
(CDFI) initiative, which was
launched in 1994. CDFIs are a
diverse collection of banks, bank-
owned community development cor-
porations, credit unions, microenter-
prise loan funds, and the like, that
have received subsidized funding
from government to serve low-
income inner-city communities. The
common defining trait of CDFIs is
their shared mission of filling gaps
in the services provided by main-
stream financial institutions.
CDFI-like institutions in fact prolif-
erated in the late 1960s, and an
understanding of their successes and
failures offers rich insights for mod-
ern-day proponents of CDFIs who
choose not to ignore the lessons of
history. Many first-generation CDFIs
were rooted in ineffective policies
that attempted to produce social-
policy fixes. The minority enterprise
small business investment company
(MESBIC) program, created by
President Nixon, was going to make
financing more widely available to
minority-owned firms, facilitating,
known as “venture” capital) invest-
ment in minority business enterpris-
es. What sorts of small businesses do




The surviving MESBICs have evolved
and adapted over the decades to the
circumstances of their marketplace
and the constraints imposed on them
by their government sponsors. Using
data provided by the Small Business
Administration, I determined that
most of the MESBICs actively invest-
ing in minority business enterprises
are asset-based lenders. Indeed, most
of the CDFIs that survive into the
twenty-first century are likely to be
asset-based lenders. Asset-based
lending is a pragmatic adaptation to
the circumstances of financing small
businesses in urban America. 
The crux of asset-based lending is
simple: If the business receiving the
loan succeeds, the MESBIC gets
repaid, and if the business fails, the
MESBIC gets repaid. Asset-based
lenders are collateral driven. Taxi
medallions, for example, represent
outstanding collateral; they have
appreciated steadily in value and
they are highly liquid. If the taxi
owner defaults on the loan, the
MESBIC repossesses the cab medal-
lion and sells it for an amount
as Senator John Tower of Texas, co-
sponsor of the legislation creating
the program, claimed, “capital for-
mation in the minority community
generally.” A detailed understanding
of the failures and successes of that
earlier era offers society the oppor-
tunity to replicate the successes and
avoid many of the pitfalls of a pre-
vious generation of CDFIs.
The MESBIC program typifies an
ambitious effort that has generated
mixed,  often negative, results. Most
MESBICs failed long ago and closed
their doors. Yet some have grown
large and highly profitable by
financing minority firms. MESBICs
are privately owned, small business
investment companies that receive
part of their funding at subsidized
rates from the U.S. Small Business
Administration. These funds are
largely invested in immigrant and
minority-owned businesses and they
provide patient capital, that is, equi-
ty capital, as well as long-term sub-
ordinated debt. 
The uniqueness of MESBICs,
renamed Specialized Small Business
Investment Companies in the 1990s,
lies in their status as equity-capital
providers to minority business enter-
prises. Prior to the mid 1990s, no
other federal government small
business assistance efforts sought to
encourage equity capital (popularly
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CDFIs work in niche markets that are under-
served by traditional financial institutions. They
operate with a “dual bottom line” of develop-
ment impact and financial return.prises in the MESBIC industry, it also
suggests that most small MESBICs
are not capable of meeting the goals
that justified creation of the MESBIC




The CDFIs that were so actively pro-
moted by the Clinton Administration
began operating in the mid 1990s
with funding that partially reflects
subsidies from the federal govern-
ment. Funding small businesses in
inner-city, low-income minority
communities is a major part of their
mandate. The fact that the vast
majority of the MESBICs chartered
since 1969 had similar missions and
went out of business should be note-
worthy to CDFI planners. Have we
learned the right lessons from the
MESBIC experience? 
Heeding the lessons of 30 years of
MESBIC operating experience is not
apparent at one of the premier
CDFIs, a financial institution organ-
ized in the Atlanta empowerment
zone in August 1996 as a
Community and Individual Invest-
ment Corporation. Identified as a
“for-profit” entity, its mandate
includes funding for the following:
* Micro loans ranging from $1,000
to $5,000, to finance inventory,
working capital, and equipment for
home-based businesses and self-
employed individuals; 
* Start-up loans and “micro-equity”
investments ranging from $5,000
to $50,000, to finance inventory,
equipment and facilities, and other
costs for businesses with fewer
than three years of operating or
earnings history; 
* Expansion loans of up to
$500,000 for the acquisition of
inventory, equipment, and facilities
for established firms whose growth
plans exceed internal financing
capacity; and
* Commercial mortgage loans of up
to $500,000 for the acquisition and
improvement of income property
within the empowerment zone and
linked communities.
All of this broadly resembles an
unsuccessful MESBIC strategy to
target both small firms operating in
the local community and larger-
scale firms with growth potential. Of
the many scores of MESBICs that
pursued such investment strategies
in the 1970s, none remain today.
Most went broke; the survivors rad-
ically changed their investment
and equity investments in large-
scale minority business enterprises.
Financial Viability
Among MESBICs
Small-scale MESBICs are frequently
not viable from a cost-of-operations
perspective. Examining the consoli-
dated income statement for all
active MESBICs operating in 1993
reveals that the industry as a whole
is unprofitable. The typical MESBIC
generated 7.33 cents in revenues per
asset dollar, while incurring expens-
es of 8.43 cents to generate those
revenues. The resultant spread per
asset dollar was minus 1.10 cents
before taxes and minus 1.18 cents
after taxes. Sales of securities added
more negative numbers to the bot-
tom line: The mean MESBIC, on bal-
ance, lost 2.70 cents per asset dollar
in 1993.
For the MESBIC industry, 1993’s
financial performance was not an
atypical year. Examination of indus-
try financial statements for other
recent years revealed patterns of
recurring losses from operations,
frequent losses from the sale and
disposal of venture-capital invest-
ments, and a high attrition rate.
The smaller MESBICs clearly did
worse than the larger ones. Picking
an arbitrary cutoff and defining
MESBICs with less than $2 million
in total assets as “small,” and the
others as “large,” stark differences
stand out on the expense side of the
aggregate income statements. Over
the 1987 to 1993 period, loan losses
and labor costs absorbed 38.8 per-
cent of the total revenues of the
average large MESBIC, versus 66.5
percent of the total revenues of the
typical small MESBIC.
The clearest message emerging
from the MESBIC data and the ear-
lier discussion of the MESBIC char-
acteristics is that failure-prone
MESBICs are identifiable. Small
MESBICs that generate high
expenses per dollar of total assets




Survival and profitability, for
MESBICs with total assets of under
$5 million, is promoted by investing
in bank CDs, not minority-owned
businesses. Although this finding
may explain why money-market
investments are much more wide-
spread than venture-capital invest-
ments in minority business enter-
exceeding the outstanding loan bal-
ance. Asset-based lenders are less
concerned about the viability or the
growth prospects of the minority
business being financed than they
are about the value of the collateral
that protects them from loss in the
event of loan default.
Beyond taxi medallions, MESBICs
have focused upon small-scale, tra-
ditional small business industries —
restaurants, laundries, and groceries.
Loans flow largely to Asian immi-
grant business owners, and they are
concentrated in major urban centers
of Asian immigration, particularly
Los Angeles and New York. 
Although the industries MESBICs
invest in are often full of tiny firms,
such as restaurants, the typical small
business financed by a MESBIC is
not a tiny firm. The median minority
business enterprise nationwide is a
zero-employee operation, but the
median enterprise attracting a MES-
BIC investment is an employer.
Likewise, the median minority enter-
prise nationwide has annual rev-
enues of less than $100,000, but the
median enterprise receiving MESBIC
funds has annual sales exceeding
$500,000. The firms receiving
financing also have high collateral
value, such as real estate holdings. 
Asset-based lenders make no equity-
capital investments in small busi-
nesses; they provide collaterized
loans. MESBICS, however, were
encouraged by the Small Business
Administration to provide equity
capital. The majority of MESBICs
that have actively extended venture
capital have been unsuccessful.
However, while active venture-capi-
tal investing has led many MESBICs
into bankruptcy, others have thrived
by making equity investments in
large-scale enterprises operating in
wholesaling, manufacturing, com-
munications, and business services. 
The MESBIC industry is clearly seg-
mented in terms of its targeted clien-
teles and the types of investments
made in minority business enterpris-
es. Smaller-scale MESBICs (with
total assets of under $5 million)
focus on asset-based lending to
minority enterprises operating in
traditional fields such as food stores.
They rarely make equity invest-
ments. Larger-scale MESBICs are
segmented into groups of asset-
based lenders with no equity invest-
ments, and more broadly based fin-
anciers looking to make both debt
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Mark Pinsky
President and Chief Executive Officer
National Community Capital Association
National Community Capital Association is a nonprof-
it organization working to promote capital investment
in economically disadvantaged communities. The
Association solicits funding, technical assistance, and
development services for CDFIs and then helps those
CDFIs invest resources to better their communities. 
On comparing CDFIs to MESBICs:
“The comparison of CDFIs to MESBICS is not apples
to apples, it’s more like oranges to pears. The problem
with the MESBIC model of investing in inner-city
minority businesses was that you had strategies that
were defined by public-policy objectives. It was a
faulty assumption that MESBICS would produce pub-
lic good just because they were serving the inner-city
minority community. CDFIs, and the CDFI Fund, sup-
port market-based solutions. No government applica-
tion determines whether a business gets CDFI fund-
ing; it must have a business plan showing a market
need for the product or service. So, CDFIs are market-
based, not public policy-based, and we are account-
able to the market, not the government. This is a fun-
damental distinction.”
On CDFI purpose:
“[CDFIs] bring mainstream financial institutions into
the lives of people who are economically disadvan-
taged, and vice versa — they work best just outside
the margins of traditional capital providers. CDFIs
should constantly be cultivating, developing, and
finding new markets. What we [National Community
Capital Association] do is try to strengthen financial
intermediaries (CDFIs) to achieve real impact. And
we’ve seen significant progress. Back in the mid to
late 1990s, when Bank of America announced they
were going to fund over $10 billion in women- and
minority-owned businesses, I said that the best thing
our industry could do would be to claim victory and
move on. If we can convince major financial institu-
tions that investing in these businesses and these
communities is not what it seems, then we have
accomplished something very significant.”
strategies and became asset-based
lenders and high-end venture capi-
tal investors of today. CDFIs that
pursue a strategy of risky small-
business investing will experience
similar fates.
The late C. Robert Kemp, CEO of Los
Angeles Community Development
Bank, headed one of the nation’s
largest CDFIs. Kemp recognized that
his institution must target its loans
to the sophisticated, high-end busi-
nesses that are located in its market,
the Los Angeles Empowerment
Zone: “transactions of scale are the
ones that will produce jobs for
empowerment zone residents and
improve general economic condi-
tions within the zone.” Yet the Los
Angeles Community Development
Bank also actively funds microen-
terprise loans of up to $25,000.
These are rationalized as useful for
boosting new business start-ups, but
the microenterprise program, Kemp
noted, is “very expensive” and ulti-
mately sustainable only if it is sup-
ported by continuing subsidies. 
Absent subsidies, government insis-
tence that CDFIs actively fund high-
risk, high-cost loans is a recipe for
disaster. Failure can be avoided by
permitting CDFIs to operate with
sufficient flexibility to minimize
financing activities that consistently
lose money. Consistent losses
destroyed financial institutions such
as MESBICs. At this moment we can
expect a similar outcome for many
of the CDFIs.
About the Author
Timothy Bates is Distinguished
Professor of Labor and Urban
Affairs at Wayne State University.
Why CDFIs Are Different
An Industry Perspective
Two representatives of Community
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs)
explain below why they believe CDFIs’ fate
will be better than that of the Minority
Enterprise Small Business Investment
Corporations, described by Timothy Bates.15 c & b
On the importance of size:
“What matters for CDFIs is not overall size but propor-
tionate scale — being proportionate to the market. A
few-million-dollar CDFI working in a small rural state
could be as effective as a $50 million CDFI in an urban
center. Proportionate scale is key. CDFIs do, however,
require a subsidy. Our margins aren’t sufficient to have
the working capital of a traditional bank.”
On asset-based lending:
“CDFIs do collateral lending that would not fit the
bank standard of ‘adequate collateralization.’ CDFIs do
creative collateralization. For example, in Los Angeles
there’s a CDFI that does microlending to the Hispanic
community and it has realized that the appropriate
collateral is not a dollar for dollar match but is put-
ting a lien on the person’s car. Because the communi-
ty really values being able to drive, it is much more
effective collateral than taking business inventory.
This is what we call ‘cultural collateral’ and it has to
do with understanding the market. Also, I don’t agree
with taxi-cab funding as a model for us. Taxicabs are
an investment that is so mainstream that it doesn’t
really have any meaning.”
On examples of success and failure:
“As a person in the CDFI field, I can say I have never
heard of the Atlanta Community Individual Investment
Corporation or the Los Angeles Community
Development Bank referred to as CDFIs — I believe
they operate with a model that is not the CDFI model
and, therefore, are not accurate representations of our
industry. Bates has a history of excellent research but
I think he points here to a few badly chosen anecdotes.
Instead, I can point to 15 years of historical data. By
year-end 1999, the CDFIs we work with, which is just
a subset of the industry but tends to include the high-
er-performing ones, did $2 billion in financing with a
default rate of 1.35 percent overall, and to that point,
they had never lost a penny because they’re set up
right — they are capitalized right, they are structured
right, they manage risk right, they do their loss
reserves right.”
“Are all CDFIs good? They are not. Some are not well
run. Are there going to be some that fail? Absolutely.
Are some that the CDFI Fund supports going to fail? I
think it’s possible. But is that a risk you take in trying
to build a sector of institutions that is market-based?




The CDFI Coalition is the trade association for the
approximately 500 CDFIs operating in the United
States. Founded in 1992, the CDFI Coalition is man-
aged by the National Community Capital Association.
On misconceptions:
“I think one of the misconceptions of Bates’s paper
is that CDFIs came after MESBICS. The earliest
CDFIs, Community Development Credit Unions,
started as long as 60 years ago as part of the self-
help credit movement.” 
On realizing  missions:
“CDFIs are very community-based. They serve every-
thing from neighborhoods in urban areas to rural
markets, so CDFIs target a broad range of markets.
MESBICS were targeted toward inner-city communi-
ties. Both have a shared mission of community devel-
opment. . . but CDFIs have a broad range of strategies
for addressing the financial needs of the particular
community they’re serving.”
On challenges:
“This industry has exploded over the past five years
and part of that is due to the CDFI Fund which has
channeled in a lot of capital and has made for huge
growth. Trying to attract people to the field is going to
be a critical challenge for the next five years. We need
people who have technical knowledge, who can do the
financial analysis. But one interesting thing about
CDFIs is they have their feet in two different arenas —
community development and financial services. We
need to get the word out that this is a growing field
that has a lot of challenges. . . . Another challenge is
that CDFIs operate in a riskier marketplace, mainly
because mainstream financial markets have moved
into the field when we showed it could be lucrative.
But this is our goal.”
CDFIs are market-based, 
not public-policy based
One interesting thing
about CDFIs is they





ties, such as building inspectors and
boards of health. 
The other part of the incentive is an
appeal process. If a town rejects a
developer’s proposal, the developer
may appeal the decision to the
Massachusetts Housing Appeals
Committee. This committee has the
right to override local decisions if it
believes the need for affordable
housing outweighs local objections
to the development.
The major changes proposed for 40B
are to define more broadly what
“counts” as affordable housing, such
as manufactured housing, Section 8
vouchers, housing for the mentally
ill or even jail inmates; or to lower
the percentage of affordable housing
called for statewide from 10 percent
to 8 percent or less. 
Two days before July 4, lawmakers
in the House attached some of these
amendments to a housing bill,
including provisions that manufac-
tured housing, Section 8 vouchers,
and long-term housing for the men-
tally ill or retarded should be includ-
ed in a town’s 10 percent count. The
bill passed — making more towns
independent from the requirement to
build affordable housing. According
to a survey done by Citizens
Housing and Planning Association,
an affordable housing advocate, an
additional 67 communities became
exempt from Chapter 40B’s reach.
The housing bill now proceeds to the
Senate and Governor Jane Swift’s
office. Her office says it will
adamantly oppose changes that
compromise the law.
Chapter 40B
Finding an affordable home in
Massachusetts, where the average single-family home
sells for near $300,000, can be like looking for bargains
in Neiman Marcus — most times, they don’t exist. The
problem is even worse in the Boston metro area, where
the average single-family home sells for just under
$450,000. Lawmakers in Massachusetts recognized an
affordable housing problem in 1969 when they enacted
the Comprehensive Permit Law, also known as Chapter
40B. While the need for affordable housing remains 
dire, this year suburban lawmakers have proposed over 30
bills to amend the law. Some of these amendments have
been passed by the House of Representatives, to the woe
of urban lawmakers and housing and community advo-
cates. As of the end of July, it is not clear if the amend-
ments will be adopted by the Senate and the governor.
Chapter 40B, dubbed the “anti-snob zoning law,”
gives developers using a public subsidy an incentive
to build affordable housing throughout the
Commonwealth by circumventing “exclusionary”
zoning laws. The incentive includes a streamlined
review process, called the comprehensive permit,
exempting developers from local zoning require-
ments, such as restrictions against multifamily hous-
ing, if less than 10 percent of the town’s housing
stock is affordable for low- and moderate-income
earners. In theory, developers can accelerate the
approval process (thereby saving money) when they
don’t have to get approvals from separate local enti-
h h h h h h h h h h h
. . . and its next chapter by Kristin KandersO
ver the law’s 30-year history, the terms “subsidized,” “low-
and moderate-income,” and “affordable,” have all been
used to describe the housing that Chapter 40B aims to
develop. If a developer wants to build a 40B development, then at
least 25 percent of the units must be affordable for 15 years.
(Buildings that are substantially rehabilitated must remain afford-
able for at least five years.) 
Towns with less than 10 percent of their year-round housing stock
considered affordable by the statute, or with affordable housing
existing on less than 1.5 percent of the town’s residential, commer-
cial, and industrial land, are subject to 40B requests. Housing is
“affordable” for households with incomes less than 80 percent of the
median area household income, paying not more than 30 percent of
income on housing. 40B developments must rely on subsidies from
state and federal programs, such as the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency. 
If a 40B development is built in a community, it “counts” toward a
town’s affordable housing goal of 10 percent. It matters, however,
whether the development is rental or ownership. For rental proper-
ties, all the units count as affordable, whereas in home-owner
developments, only the individual below-market-rate homes count
as affordable. Chapter 40B can be used to develop condominiums,
single-family homes, housing developments, senior housing, and
assisted-living developments.
Chapter 1 of Chapter 40B: Gritty Details
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development came back with a 640-
unit 40B application. “The law is a
hatchet — we need a scalpel,” she
remarked. Rep. Donovan represents a
community that, like others in the
Commonwealth, is faced with multi-
ple 40B applications. She is sponsor-
ing bills that would make the deter-
mination of a town’s 10 percent
affordable housing more inclusive
by counting Section 8 housing
vouchers, or subsidized housing for
the mentally ill or retarded. Her bills
attempt to compensate for a felt
inequity that while Woburn “is defi-
nitely not a snob community,” it is
treated as one by the law. She
believes the law needs adjustment
since it “never came to fruition in
the communities it was meant for.”
Housing advocates, however, do
not want to tamper with a law that
has lasted over 30 years and has
produced desperately needed hous-
ing. Sharon Krefetz, who has
researched 40B, says the number of
communities without subsidized
housing has fallen from 173 in the
early 1970s to 54 in the late 1990s,
with most of the 54 being small,
rural communities with less than
200 housing units. Jane Gumble,
Director of the Massachusetts
Department of Housing and
Community Development (DHCD),
Why Now?
To understand the debate generated
by Chapter 40B, it helps to know
why it’s raging. The real estate mar-
ket in Massachusetts is one of the
strongest in the nation. Statistics
from the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight show that house
prices in Massachusetts have appre-
ciated 364 percent since 1980, more
than twice the national average of
156. Prices in the Commonwealth
are on track to increase 13.2 percent
this year. For the quarter ending in
March, Massachusetts ranked fourth
in the country for annual house price
appreciation (a yearly rate of 13.2
percent), surpassed only by the
District of Columbia, California, and
New Hampshire. With a hot real
estate market, developers want to
build, and with increased building —
especially building that may violate
local zoning ordinances, as 40B
allows — comes controversy. 
According to Steven Pierce,
Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency Executive Director, Chapter
40B is being used actively today
because 40B developments are easier
to finance in a strong real estate
market; with high market-rate prices,
it takes less to subsidize a develop-
ment’s one-quarter or more below-
market units. As you may have
guessed, Chapter 40B was also used
frequently, and was a contentious
issue, during the real estate boom of
the mid to late 1980s. 
Another reason why 40B is being
actively used and contested today as it
was during the mid to late 1980s, says
Sharon Krefetz of Clark University
and Harvard’s Joint Center for
Housing Studies, is because a relative-
ly new financing source is helping to
make projects more feasible for pri-
vate developers. The New England
Fund, created by the Federal Home
Loan Bank, was deemed to qualify as
a public subsidy in 1999 by the
Housing Appeals Committee. Com-
pared to direct state and federal sub-
sidy programs, says Krefetz, the New
England Fund has “few regulatory
strings attached.” Like the Home-
ownership Opportunity Program
(HOP), a state housing program begun
in 1986, this new funding source is
attracting some developers who want
to build large-scale developments.
This is stirring a backlash at 40B. 
When Bigger Is Not Better
Increased building stirs emotions,
but increased building of large-scale
projects in a select number of com-
munities can cause turmoil. Add in a
community’s feeling of powerless-
ness to the will of the developer, and
you heighten the storm. Lawmakers
lobbying for change represent com-
munities that feel they are being
besieged by the law, at the mercy of
developers who use 40B as a threat
if their market-rate developments
are not approved by the town.
Typically, these towns are not the
richest in the Commonwealth (where
high land costs tend to make 40B
deals uneconomic) but are middle-
income towns with housing the
town considers to be affordable —
but is not, according to the statute.
An editorial in the Eagle-Tribune, a
newspaper representing Northern
Massachusetts, expresses the view,
“Developers use the law to ramrod
through giant projects no sane com-
munity would approve.”
In Waltham, developers have
angered some town residents by fil-
ing simultaneously for zoning relief
to build a 218-unit non-40B rental
unit and, if it’s not approved, a 301-
unit 40B complex. Representative
Donovan of Woburn, in May 16 tes-
timony to the Committee on Housing
and Urban Development, stated that
developers who were denied permis-
sion to build a 400-unit market rateknowledge, comes power.” Some of
the proposed regulations would
install a “cooling-off” period
between the time a developer is
turned down for a market-rate
development and initiation of a 40B
application for the same site. Other
regulations would set parameters
for maximum community popula-
tion increases resulting from a 40B
development and would increase
the minimum terms of affordability
from five to 15 years for rehab proj-
ects and from 15 to 30 years for
new development.
Report Card for 40B
Massachusetts is seen as a leader
(and sometimes a maverick) when it
comes to housing policy, but has
40B been successful? Is the
Commonwealth getting better at
providing affordable housing?
The affordable housing situation has
improved since the anti-snob zoning
law was passed, but not enough that
affordable housing is in adequate
supply. Estimates from academics
and from housing advocates indicate
that between 20,000 and 25,000
units of affordable housing have
been produced directly by Chapter
40B, and the two sides of the
Chapter 40B debate can find fodder
in this statistic, citing either that 40B
has produced “fewer than 1,000
units per year” or that 40B has
enabled “desperately needed units of
affordable housing to be constructed
when they otherwise wouldn’t in
stated at the legislative hearing that
63 towns would reach the 10 per-
cent threshold by adding 100 or
fewer units.
To dissuade lawmakers from chang-
ing the law, Housing and
Community Development has pro-
posed regulatory reform, not
amendments. The Department
wants to make 40B a strong and
effective law, says Phil Hailer, com-
munications director for the agency.
As an advocate of both communi-
ties and housing, the Department is
suggesting regulatory changes to
address community concerns about
the law being used as a hammer. “A
lot of communities don’t under-
stand their rights and the ramifica-
tions of the law,” adds Hailer. “We
want them to know that with
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communities that never before had
affordable housing.” 
While it is true that most towns in
Massachusetts have not reached
their 10 percent goal (only 24 of the
351 have, according to DHCD),
Chapter 40B has had success spread-
ing affordable housing through the
Commonwealth. Citizens Housing
and  Planning Association (CHAPA)
cites the fact that Massachusetts’ 15
largest municipalities had 69 percent
of the affordable-housing units in
1972, but only 37 percent in 1997, as
proof of “opening up the suburbs.” 
Proponents of Chapter 40B, such as
CHAPA, also stress that the law has
been useful in getting affordable
housing in general built throughout
the Commonwealth. Because Chapter
40B exists, towns know they are sub-
ject to 40B propositions unless they
increase their affordable housing
stock to10 percent. In support, the
DHCD notes that from 1970 to 1999,
the Massachusetts inventory of
affordable housing rose from 85,621
units to 205,000 units. As Clark
Ziegler, Executive Director of the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership
Fund says, “Chapter 40B makes
towns know that they can’t duck the
issue of affordable housing.” 
Other states have also looked to
Massachusetts for ideas on how to
bolster affordable-housing develop-
ment. Both Connecticut and Rhode
Island enacted 40B-like laws that
use the “rule of 10 percent” and pro-
vide for state override of local deci-
sions, but according to Krefetz, the
impetus for the laws differed from
that in Massachusetts. Because the
Connecticut and Rhode Island laws
were enacted in 1989 and 1991,
respectively, when many moderate-
income families were being priced
out of their communities, they focus
more on sustaining the job base
than “opening up” the suburbs to
low-income families. Accordingly,
the laws drummed up more support
from the business community than
in Massachusetts. In Connecticut
the law can be used without a gov-
ernment subsidy as long as at least
30 percent of each development
Chapter 40B makes towns know that 
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in general is an issue
with tensions. Take the
phrase, “It’s not affordable
housing we’re against, it’s
the ________” and fill in the
blank with either burden on
schools, density, or traffic
for an overview of commu-
nity concerns.
In an attempt to reduce the
obstacles that surround 40B,
the Commonwealth has ini-
tiated several new housing
programs. Executive Order
418, for example, was
signed by former Governor
Cellucci in January 2000
with the goal of supporting
communities as they strive
to include affordable hous-
ing in their towns. For com-
munities grappling with
development plans, it pro-
vides up to $30,000 in
grants and/or technical
assistance to each munici-
pality. It also uses discretion
in allocating funding to
towns that are actively try-
ing to increase their supply
of affordable housing. 
The Housing Supply Incentive Program would go a step further to
offset the costs associated with residential development, especially
schooling. The program would pay the difference between the
amount collected from tax revenues from new development and the
amount needed to educate the children living in the development.
Supported by legislators in theory, the bill has not moved through the
House of Representatives Committee on Housing and Urban
Development because of controversy about the proposed funding
source — Lottery surpluses. 
accommodates low- and moderate-
income earners; developments have
tended to be large-scale and done
by private developers. Rhode
Island’s state housing appeals board
has yet to rule on whether the New
England Fund counts as a qualified
public subsidy.
One of 40B’s greatest achievements
may also be its most subtle. When
suburban towns such as Wilmington
can tout the housing they have
negotiated with 40B developers as a
success, they influence people’s per-
ceptions about what affordable
housing looks like. This notion of
towns becoming more amenable to
affordable housing is supported by
looking at local-level rejection rates.
Whereas from 1970 to 1979, 43 per-
cent of all projects were denied by
local boards, only 20 percent were
during 1990 to 1999. In 54 percent
of all cases from 1970 to 1999, the
local board granted permits with
conditions such as infrastructure
improvements in the town and
increases in affordability time limits. 
While critics and proponents of 40B
iron out its future direction through
the fall of this year, it’s important to
remember that the main complaint
levied at the law is also its biggest
benefit. Although the law was not
intended to be used as a hammer to
threaten towns, it was intended to be
a construction tool, building more









































































































*Represents cases where one of the parties didn’t proceed (but the case 
was not formally withdrawn) and cases resolved through negotiation that 
was not moderated by the State Housing Appeals Committee, among others.
Actions of State Housing Appeals Committee (through 1999)
Attempts to Neutralize the Opposition20 c & b
“During the first meeting at the Vermont Land Trust,
two housing advocates joined a roomful of environ-
mentalists, conservationists, and rural planners who
were on a first-name basis. At first, the housing advo-
cates were fearful that affordable housing was being
added because of its popular appeal and worried that
conservationists, sometimes referred to as the ‘green
sneaker bunch,’ would not be able to understand or
address poverty and homelessness. At the same time, the
conservationists and farmers were afraid that the hous-
ing and low-income advocates would be too radical and
too dogmatic to join the coalition. Such opinions and
feelings created a lot of tension; however, most of the
fears of Coalition members were dispelled after people
began to work together, especially after they identified
common ground, and began to develop a proposal to
chart a course on that common ground.” 
Dean Christon, Deputy Executive Director of the New
Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, wishes afford-
able-housing and open-
space groups could form
an alliance in his state
but understands that in
order for a partnership to
work, “both sides have to
bring power to the
table.” Open-space advo-




able housing advocates. 
To get past these discrep-
ancies, Vermont used a
“Robin Hood” approach.
This is Libby’s description of the arrangement: “The
Vermont Natural Resources Council, Vermont Land
Trust, and the Nature Conservancy — the well-estab-
lished and financially solid members of the Coalition —
paid most of the expenses for the first year. In turn,
members like Community Action Program agencies, the
Coalition of Vermont Elders, the Low Income Advocacy
Council, and the Affordable Housing Coalition made
nominal financial contributions but guaranteed active
participation by advocates and members with commit-
ment, experience, and expertise. This organizational
approach was part of the glue that kept the Coalition
together during the early months and helped set the
stage for difficult substantive discussions.”
C
ompeting for funding and legislative support is
nothing new. Bitterness and lost potential, however,
sting more when competing groups share a com-
mon goal. In the health care field, for example, intense
funding disputes occur between advocates of basic
research and of research on particular diseases. Ironically,
each type of funding can advance the other cause; basic
research often leads to specific cures, and focused
research often leads to greater general understanding.
Likewise, in most states, affordable housing advocates
and land conservationists compete for funding, and as
with health care, each can greatly help the other’s mission
when they work together. The state of Vermont offers a
case in point. Vermont’s Housing and Conservation Board
represents the realization that housing and conservation
are two sides of an issue, not two issues. 
Created in 1987 out of pressure to save Vermont’s farms,
natural land, historic downtowns, and communities from
sprawl development, the Board works to develop afford-
able housing and conserve
historic properties, farm-
land, and natural land.
Conservationists and
affordable housing advo-




Director Gus Seelig; a
desire to see “smart
growth” and a desire to
protect the “real” Vermont
link both causes. As Tom
Slayton, editor of Vermont
Life, has commented, pro-
tecting Vermont from
becoming a “theme park” or a “sterile picture postcard”
means protecting “a working landscape that really works,
farms where farming is more than a rich man’s hobby,
real neighborhoods instead of trailer parks for the poor
and gated housing enclaves for the wealthy.”
Overcoming Obstacles
Vermont’s affordable housing advocates and land conser-
vationists came together in a citizen entity called the
Housing and Conservation Coalition. The Coalition crafted
legislation for the Vermont Land Trust and continues to
lobby for annual funding. Jim Libby, VHCB’s General
Counsel and Assistant Director, describes how the two sides





by Kristin KandersVermont. The Board continues to
strengthen Vermont’s affordable
housing nonprofits by providing
financial and technical support, and
it annually sponsors about eight
workshops on topics ranging from
“Essentials of Construction
Management” to “Principles of Good
Design in Affordable Housing.”
These workshops enable VHCB’s
nonprofit partners to be more pro-
ductive and build better housing. 
Valuing impact that is measured in
nontraditional ways doesn’t mean,
however, that VHCB’s numbers are
unimpressive. In fact, they are quite
impressive. Since 1987, Vermont’s
nonprofits have used over $130
million of VHCB grants and loans to
develop over 6,000 units of perpet-
ually affordable housing and to
conserve over 324,000 acres of land
in 205 towns. These funds have
leveraged an additional $450 mil-
lion in private and public funds. Of
the housing awards, 26 percent
were for projects in buildings eligi-
Another adhesive the Coalition
employed when drafting legislation
in 1986 was to value each other’s
philosophies. Instead of developing
affordable housing that would rely
on annual payments to maintain a
project’s viability or affordability,
the Coalition proposed that Vermont
provide loans and grants to bridge a
project’s “gap” and require recipi-
ents to ensure a project’s success.
Stewardship, an integral part of the
conservation philosophy, became
part of affordable housing discus-
sion, Libby observes. As a result,
“perpetual affordability” and “no
displacement” became synonymous
with the trust fund. The trust fund
embodies the principle that housing
is a right that should be shared with
future residents and treated as a
community resource.
The Coalition’s thoughtful legisla-
tion was well received in 1987.
Governor Madeleine Kunin signed
the trust fund into law with $3 mil-
lion in support, and the Coalition
then helped to assemble a board of
directors according to guidelines in
the statute.1 A bountiful state budg-
et and strong political support
allowed Vermont’s 1988 legislature
to put an additional $20 million into
the trust fund. Since then, says
Seelig, “the Coalition has stayed
active for 14 years and has resisted
being pulled apart.”
Measuring Impact
Meting out impact statistics of
affordable homes built/rehabilitated
and acres of farm and conservation
land protected can overlook the sig-
nificance of an organization that
has a social and ecological role as
well as a financial one. Some of
VHCB’s most important work, says
Libby, has been to “support compact
development in town centers (avoid-
ing sprawl) while at the same time
protecting land with significant eco-
nomic and natural value.”
Protecting agricultural and conser-
vation land allows the organization
to reflect the people, economy, and
traditions of Vermont. Farming is
the state’s third largest economic
sector; it protects Vermont’s land-
scape, supports local businesses and
community organizations, and
attracts visitors who make tourism
the largest sector.     
Reflecting the people of Vermont has
been a mission, but so has engaging
them to think about conservation
and affordable housing. To do this,
VHCB has relied on its partnerships
with nonprofit organizations. When
the Board started work in the late
1980s, there was “adequate nonprof-
it coverage for affordable housing in
only a couple of parts of the state,”
says Libby. The Board worked to
encourage regional housing devel-
opment corporations, and by 1994
there was sufficient nonprofit capa-
bility to meet VHCB’s goal of being
able to fund projects in all parts of
Putting adaptive reuse to work, the Vermont Arts Exchange restored two nineteenth-
century firehouses in Bennington with funding that included VHCB grants. The bottom
floors were converted into gallery space and the top floors into housing.
This 340-acre dairy farm, like
the 548-acre one on page 20, has
been conserved using VHCB
funds. Both farms’ development
rights were purchased.22 c & b
ble for, nominated for, or listed on the State or National
Register of Historic Places. Of the farms conserved with
VHCB funds, 31 percent contain historic barns, farm-
houses, or archeological sites. The fund has successfully
provided for very low-income Vermonters — roughly
half of all the housing units funded by VHCB through
2000 have been for people earning 50 percent or less of
median family income. 
Today’s Challenges
Despite having a workable formula for achieving two
goals through the work of a single entity, the road ahead
does not look completely smooth for Vermont in contin-
uing to both promote land conservation and meet afford-
able housing needs. VHCB’s Board Chair Deborah
Brighton explains the problem: “The need for affordable
housing and land conservation has intensified as the
state’s economy has strengthened. We are now facing
the lowest rental housing vacancy rates ever, as the
strong job market puts pressure on Vermont’s real
estate. . . . In many Vermont communities the vacancy
rates are below two percent. Homeownership costs are
also on the rise, and the values paid for farm and forest
land are outpacing any increases in net profits from
agriculture or forest management. . . . Vermont’s land-
based industries and rural heritage will continue to be
challenged by a marketplace that values cheap food and
quick profitability.” 
To tackle the affordable housing supply problem,
Vermont’s nonprofits are working to construct new hous-
ing, especially in Chittenden County. This represents a
departure for the many nonprofits using VHCB funds that
have focused on rehabilitation by marrying historic
preservation and affordable housing development. This
experience is clear when looking at the numbers: About
80 percent of all housing units supported by VHCB
through 2000 were acquisition and rehabilitation. 
Vermont’s holistic approach remains unique, which is
surprising, considering how successful it has been and
how much overlap exists between preserving communi-
ties and the landscape. It seems odd to distill housing out
from the land, and agriculture out from conservation. To
do so, you have to determine if a farm is beautiful, his-
toric, or a mode of sustenance and economic develop-
ment. You have to ask, is rehabilitating a building in a
town’s center affordable housing development, historic
conservation, or community preservation? As Vermont
recognizes, it is often all of these.
The Community
Preservation Act
Striving for an encompassing approach that
focuses on project perpetuity, Massachusetts
passed the Community Preservation Act in
September 2000. A local-enactment law, it
encourages towns to create individual
Community Preservation Funds to finance
affordable housing development, open space
conservation, and historic preservation.
According to the law, cities and towns may pass
a referendum to levy a community-wide sur-
charge of up to 3 percent based on property
taxes. Of the collected funds, at least 10 percent
must be allocated for each of three purposes: to
preserve open space, protect historic sites, and
build affordable housing. The remaining 70 per-
cent (after administrative needs are met) may
fund any of the allowed uses or a combination of
them. Towns are motivated to pass the act
because they will receive matching funds from
Massachusetts. So far, over 30 towns have passed
the CPA.
What has yet to be seen is how towns will use
the 70 percent discretionary funding. Low-
income advocates and others worry that the Act
might skew toward benefiting wealthy towns
and open-space preservation. As a concerned
person wrote in the Community Preservation
Coalition’s on-line discussion forum, “Is this CPA
just more snobbism. . . under the disguise of pre-
serving open space?”
For further reading on the VHCB, see Jim Libby’s article “The
Vermont Housing and Conservation Trust Fund: A Unique
Approach to Affordable Housing,” Clearinghouse Review, Vol.
23, No 10 (February 1990), pp. 1275-1284. It is also available
at www.vhcb.org/article.html. A more recent discussion of the
Vermont experience co-authored by Libby and Darby Bradley,
president of Vermont Land Trust, is “VHCB: A Conspiracy of
Good Will among Land Trusts and Housing Trusts,” found in
the book Property and Values — Alternatives to Public and
Private Ownership, Island Press, 2000. The Statute enabling the
Vermont Housing and Conservation Trust Fund is 10 V.S.A.
Chapter 15.
1. According to the statute, the Vermont Housing and
Conservation Board must consist of four officials from the state
departments of housing, development, agriculture, and natural
resources and five public members, appointed by the governor,
who are “experienced in creating affordable housing or conserv-
ing and protecting Vermont’s agricultural land, historic proper-
ties, important natural areas, or recreational lands.” Additionally,
“at least one member shall be a representative of lower income
Vermonters and one member shall be a farmer. . . .”
This Shaftsbury building, along with its twin, was reha-
bilitated into affordable housing apartments according
to federal standards for historic preservation.23 c & b
Question: What is a covered agreement?
Answer: A covered agreement is one that meets all of the
following five criteria:
1. The agreement is in writing;
2. The parties to it are an insured depository institution or
affiliate and a non-governmental entity or person (NGEP);
3. The agreement involves payments of more than $10,000
or loans of more than $50,000 in any calendar year;
4. The agreement is made in fulfillment of the CRA; and
5. There has been a prior “CRA Communication” between
the parties.
Q: For a prior “CRA Communication” to take place, is it
enough if one of the parties to the agreement simply
mentions CRA?
A: No. Merely mentioning community needs and oppor-
tunities or the CRA eligibility of a loan, investment, or
service product is not a CRA communication. A CRA
Communication must pertain to the adequacy of a bank’s
(or an affiliate’s) CRA performance.
Q: What agreements are not covered?
A: Individual loans secured by real estate are not covered
regardless of the identity of the borrower and regardless of
the rate charged on the loan. Specific agreements to make
single loans are not covered if the loan is not made at a
rate substantially below market and it is not used to relend. 
Q: Are parties to the covered agreement required to make
the agreement available to the public? 
A: Yes. Parties to the covered agreement must make cov-
ered agreements entered into after November 12, 1999
available to the public upon request. Any obligation to
disclose, however, ends 12 months after the end of the
term of the agreement. If the agreement, however, termi-
nated before April 1, 2001, the parties must make the
agreement available to the public until April 1, 2002.
Q: What if there is proprietary information in a cov-
ered agreement?
A: The parties may withhold from public disclosure con-
fidential or proprietary information that the party believes
the relevant supervisory agency could withhold from dis-
closure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Q: What information are parties to the covered agreement
required to disclose to the relevant supervisory agency?2
A: The NGEP must provide a complete copy of the cov-
ered agreement to the relevant supervisory agency (RSA)
When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Section
711 of the Act added a new section 48 to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act entitled “CRA Sunshine Requirements.”1 The
CRA Sunshine provisions require the reporting and public
disclosure of written agreements between insured depository
institutions or their affiliates and nongovernmental entities
or persons made in connection with fulfillment of the
Community Reinvestment Act.
In the wake of the new CRA Sunshine provisions, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored three Sunshine Provision
training seminars in New England. The following is a list of
some of the questions audience members posed to panelists:
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within 30 days of receiving a request from the superviso-
ry agency. The NGEP must also file a redacted public ver-
sion should the NGEP choose to exclude certain confi-
dential or proprietary information under the FOIA.
The insured depository institution or affiliate must, within
60 days of the end of each calendar quarter, provide each
RSA with a complete copy of each covered agreement
entered into during the calendar quarter. If the institution
or affiliate seeks to exclude certain information in the pub-
lic version of the agreement, it must submit the public ver-
sion with an explanation justifying the exclusions.
Alternatively, the insured depository institution or affili-
ate can provide a list of all covered agreements entered
into during the calendar quarter. The list must contain the
following:
1. The names and addresses of the parties to the covered
agreements;
2. The agreement date;
3. The estimated total value of all payments, fees, loans and
any other consideration to be provided by the institution or
the affiliate of the institution under the agreement;  and 
4. The date the agreement terminates.
All parties to the covered agreement must file a report
annually with the appropriate agency concerning the dis-
bursement, the receipt and use of funds or other resources
under the agreement.
Q: How does the CRA Sunshine Provision affect the
Community Reinvestment Act?
A: The Sunshine provision does not in any way affect the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, its implementing
regulations or the agencies’ interpretations or administra-
tion of the Act or the regulations.
For further questions about CRA Sunshine, call the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s Consumer Regulations
hotline, (617) 973-3755, or visit the Federal Reserve’s web
site, www.federalreserve.gov.
Endnotes
1. The federal bank regulatory agencies issued substantially
similar regulations implementing the Sunshine provisions of
FDIA. The Federal Reserve Board’s version, Regulation G,
became effective on April 1, 2001.
2. Relevant supervisory agency is defined in the regulation as
the appropriate federal banking agency for (1) each insured
depository institution (or subsidiary) that is a party to the cov-
ered agreement; (2) each insured depository institution (or sub-
sidiary) or CRA affiliate that makes payments or loans or pro-
vides services that are subject to the covered agreement; and (3)
any  company (other than an insured depository institution or
subsidiary) that is a party to the covered agreement.
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CRA Sunshine Provisions
News Item
An interagency advance notice of proposed rulemaking
regarding the Community Reinvestment Act was pub-
lished in the Federal Register on July 19. 
Public comments must be received by October 17, 2001.